The assessment of patent pools under antitrust law, a comparative analysis by Selander, Helena
  
 
FACULTY OF LAW 
Lund University 
 
 
 
Helena Selander 
 
 
The$assessment$of$patent$pools$under$antitrust$law$
A$comparative$analysis 
 
Abstract: Patent pooling is used mainly in the electronics sector, making possible 
joint licensing of patents in order to create faster development at lower costs. 
Patent pools also serve the purpose of unlocking blocking positions among patent 
holders. Benefits of patent pooling are thus vast, yet these arrangements can also 
cause detriment to competition. The anti-competitive approach on patent pooling 
held by the EU Commission is in some fundamental ways different from the one 
held by U.S antitrust authorities. I will present these differences and suggest a 
practice in order to erase some of these differences in order to benefit 
technological development.  
 
 
 
 
JURM02 Graduate Thesis 
 
Graduate Thesis, Master of Laws programme 
30 higher education credits 
 
 
Supervisor: Hans Henrik Lidgard 
 
Semester: HT2013 
 
 
 
Contents 
SUMMARY 1!
SAMMANFATTNING 2!
PREFACE 3!
ABBREVIATIONS 4!
1! INTRODUCTION 5!
1.1! Background 5!
1.2! Purpose 6!
1.3! Method 7!
1.4! Disposition 7!
1.5! Limitations 8!
2! PATENT POOLS 9!
2.1! Patents and technological development 9!
2.2! Blocking patents 9!
2.3! The definition of patent pools 10!
2.4! Different cathegories of patent pools 11!
2.4.1! Essential patents 12!
2.5! The pro-competitive effects of patent pools 13!
2.5.1! Lowering transaction costs 13!
2.5.2! Reducing litigation costs 13!
2.5.3! Clearing blocking patents 14!
2.5.4! Spreading risk 15!
3! EU ANTITRUST POLICY ON PATENT POOLS 16!
3.1! The EU antitrust policy on patented rights (IPR) 16!
3.1.1! Free movement of goods 16!
3.2! Competition rules in the TFEU 17!
3.2.1! Article 101.1 17!
3.2.2! Article 101.3 17!
3.2.3! Block exemptions 18!
3.3! Patent pools under the Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation and 
Guidelines 19!
3.3.1! Commission regulation 772/2004 19!
3.3.2! The Technology Transfer Guidelines 20!
3.3.3! The anti-competitive risks of patent pools according to the Commission, as 
described in the Guidelines 21!
3.3.3.1! The anti-competitive risks of including substitute patents in a patent pool 
 22!
3.3.3.2! The anti-competitive risks of including non-essential patents in a patent pool 
 22!
3.3.3.3! Exclusivity and grant back clauses 23!
3.3.3.4! Exchange of sensitive information 23!
3.3.3.5! Protection of invalid patents 23!
3.3.4! Summary of the anti-competitive risks 24!
3.3.5! The operation of the pool 24!
3.4! Case law 24!
3.4.1! The DVD technology pool 24!
3.4.2! The 3G Mobile Services Pool 26!
3.5! The 2013 proposal for a revised Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation
 27!
4! AMERICAN ANTITRUST POLICY ON PATENT POOLS 29!
4.1! The U.S antitrust law 29!
4.2! The U.S antitrust policy on patent rights, the US Guidelines for Licensing of 
Intellectual Property 30!
4.3! Patent pools under the US Guidelines for Licensing Intellectual Property 31!
4.4! Anti-competitive concerns of the U.S Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission 33!
4.4.1! Substitute patents 33!
4.4.2! Exclusive and non-exclusive licenses 34!
4.4.3! Grantbacks 34!
4.4.4! Access to information 35!
4.4.5! Request for partial licenses from a pool 35!
4.5! Case Law relating to patent pools 35 
4.5.1! The early approach to patent pools 35 
4.5.1.2! The Manufactureres Aircraft Association 36 
4.5.2! The current approach to patent pools 38 
4.5.2.1! The MPEG 2 Pool 37!
4.5.2.2! The 3C DVD Pools 38!
4.5.2.3! The 6C DVD Pool 39!
4.5.2.4! The Summit-VISX Pool 40!
4.6! The American Bas Association’s view on EU antitrust policy on patent pools and the 
current draft 40!
4.6.1! Inclusion of non-essential patents 41!
4.6.2! Presumption of market power 42!
4.6.3! Expanision of the scope of the TTBER 42!
5! ANALYSIS 44!
5.1! The current state of law 44!
5.1.1! EU Law 44!
5.1.2! U.S Law 44 
5.2! Current Technological developments; Patents pools within Biotechnology  
  45!
5.3! Presumption of market power 46!
5.4! The Draft TTBER and Guidelines 46!
5.5! Conclusion 47!
BIBLIOGRAPHY 50!
TABLE OF CASES 54!
 
 
 
1 
Summary 
This thesis identifies the differences in the antitrust regulations concerning 
patent pooling within the EU and the U.S. Patent pooling enables firms to 
jointly licence their patents as a package, gathering patents that are 
necessary in order to produce a certain product. Patent pooling allows faster 
development at lower costs, since firms can attain all necessary patents 
through one single license. Patent pools also serve the purpose of unlocking 
blocking positions among patent holders; such blockages can otherwise 
hinder further development due to the risk of infringing others’ patents. 
 
The European Commission and the U.S antitrust authorities have 
established their positions concerning patents and licensing of such rights in 
written guidelines. The approach on patent pooling held by the European 
Commission is, however, in several ways different from the approach held 
by U.S antitrust authorities (the FTC and the DoJ). 
 
In February next year the current TTBER (block exemption regulation 
concerning technology transfer agreements) and the Guidelines will expire, 
the Commission therefore has drafted a new regulation as well as new 
Guidelines. Patent pooling has up until now, and will continuously be, 
excluded from block exemption, making the TTBER non-applicable on 
pooling arrangements. The approach on patent pools held by the 
Commission is therefore clarified only in the Guidelines, identifying the 
anticompetitive issues of patent pooling and establishing as a general rule 
that inclusion of substitutable patents in pools is regarded as anti-
competitive. The general rule and the Commissions approach on substitute 
patents is the most prominent difference to the approach held by the FC and 
the DoJ. The drafted Guidelines are in some ways more lenient, but the 
approach held by the U.S antitrust authorities is still in many ways different, 
but the general rule still applies. This difference is also identified and 
questioned by the American Bar Association.  
 
In my analysis I will, based on the above-identified differences, suggest an 
effects based assessment of inclusion of substitute patents, with the intention 
of benefiting patent pooling within the European Union.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
Sammanfattning 
Denna uppsats behandlar de konkurrensrättsliga skillnaderna i EU-rätt och 
amerikans rätt rörande patentpooler. Genom patentpooler ges företag 
möjlighet att gemensamt samla sina patent inom ett visst tekniskt område 
och tillsammans licensera dem. Genom poolning av patent ökar 
möjligheterna för snabb utveckling samtidigt som licenskostnaderna 
minskar då samtliga nödvändiga patent blir tillgängliga genom en enda 
licens. Vidare är också patentpooler en möjlighet för att förhindra låsningar 
patentinnehavare emellan, något som annars riskerar att förhindra 
vidareutveckling inom olika tekniska områden.  
 
Både Kommissionen och de amerikanska konkurrensrättsmyndigheterna har 
förtydligat sina respektive förhållningssätt till patentpooler och andra 
licensavtal i Guidelines. Av dessa framgår att EU Kommissionen förhåller 
sig till poolning av patenträttigheter på ett sätt som på många sätt skiljer sig 
från det sätt som det amerikanska FTC och DoJ tolkar de 
konkurrensrättsliga problemen rörande dessa avtal.  
 
I februari nästa år kommer den nuvarande Guidelines:en tillsammans med 
gruppundantagsförordningen TTBER att förfalla, Kommissionen har därför 
författat ett utkast som ska ersätta dessa. Patentpooler kommer fortsatt att 
uteslutas från möjligheten att gruppundantags, då dessa avtal är 
exkluderande från tillämpningen av TTBER både i den nuvarande 
förordningen och i utkastet. Däremot behandlas patent pooler i 
Guidelines:en, där de konkurrensrättsliga riskerna med dessa avtal tydligt 
identifieras. Vidare fastslås även huvudregeln att utbytbara patent inte får 
inkluderas i pooler, då detta antas skada konkurrensen. Denna huvudregel 
och Kommissionens förhållningssätt till inkluderingen av utbytbara paten i 
pooler utgör den största skillnaden mellan europarättslig reglering och 
amerikansk. Denna skillnad identifieras och problematiseras även av det 
amerikanska advokatsamfundet.  
 
I min analys föreslår jag en renodlad effektanalys av inkluderingen av 
utbytbara patent i pooler. Detta för att möjliggöra en ökad användning av 
patentpooler inom EU.  
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1 Introduction  
 
1.1 Background 
The mutual point of view, in both the US and the European Union, 
regarding Intellectual property rights and Competition law and the possible 
conflict of interest between the two, is that they are not in principle regarded 
as conflicting interests but on the contrary regarded as serving the mutual 
purpose of enhancing sound competition, promoting innovation and 
protecting consumers. Despite that, there are occurrences when these two 
interests serve their purposes by protecting conflicting interest. Intellectual 
property law on one hand protecting the exclusive rights held by a company 
with an intellectual property and on the other hand, the conflicting interests 
of other companies wishing to produce competing products as well as 
consumers wanting a range of products at low prices. As a result, 
competition authorities are put in a position of trying to assess the two, 
apparently very separate, interests.  
  
Patent pools are considered arrangements with many pro-competitive 
effects, such as limiting transaction costs by reducing costly litigations 
between parties with conflicting patents, reducing the royalty cost for 
licensing of several patents as well as creating opportunities for 
technological development and research. Further, patent pools can hinder 
lock-ups; when companies are hindered from using their patents to their full 
extent due to blocking patents.  
 
Yet, these agreements also imply risks on competition that might have 
negative effect on the consumers. Patent pooling might under certain 
circumstances become anti-competitive by causing price fixing and 
foreclosing of actors outside the pool, this effect is most being likely if 
licensed patents within the pool are substitutable.  Other possible issues are 
vertical restrictions as well as exclusivity clauses in the pools licensing 
agreements, limiting parties right to license its patents outside the pool.  
 
Currently, there are large differences in the assessment of the possible Anti-
competitive risks inherent in patent pooling, and the handling of these under 
EU law and U.S law. Many questions can be raised regarding the grounds 
for these differences; can they be explained by a different structure and 
focus in U.S antitrust policy compared to the EU’s antitrust policy. The 
Commission implies this in its’ analysis of antitrust risks in licensing 
agreement being more of a judicial analysis, whereas the U.S antitrust 
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authorities1 applying a more effects based, economical analysis to these 
agreements.2  
 
Within the EU, licensing agreements are block exempted from application 
of article 101.1 TFEU3 under the Technology Transfer Block Exemption 
Regulation (TTBER), EC 772/2004. The assessment of licensing 
agreements is described thoroughly in the Commission’s Guidelines, 
following the regulation. The Guidelines setting out the principles for its 
application, also pointing out the potential risks on competition in these 
agreements. 
 
The regulation excludes patent pools from its’ scope, resulting in patent-
pools not being presumed as fulfilling the efficiency assessment in art 101.3 
TFEU. The American Bar Association has questioned such exclusion of 
these agreements from the Block Exemption,4 something that implies a far 
more restrictive approach to patent pooling within the EU than the one held 
by the U.S Antitrust Agencies. 
 
Additionally it has recently been suggested that both the regulations and the 
Guidelines will be updated in 2014, nevertheless the Commission’s 
stringent approach to patent pooling is still noticeable in the current draft for 
the new regulation. 
 
1.2 Purpose 
 
In order to fully understand the circumstances of the differences in EU and 
U.S Antitrust Policy regarding patent pools, I will analyse these differences 
and how they are apparent in current legislation. Further it is relevant due to 
the suggested changes of the EU regulations on the subject to highlight the 
differences and question whether the EU policy could benefit from a less 
restrictive approach. Based on this examination I want to draw conclusions 
applicable to further EU development. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to compare and clarify the EU and U.S position 
on patent-pools and the reasons for the different approaches in order to 
suggest a best practice for the EU. 
                                                
1 The U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission 
2 Gilbert,)R,)February((2004),)p.)2.3. 
3 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ [2012] C-326/47. 
4 Joint comments of the American Bar Association, (2002) 
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1.3 Method and material 
In this thesis I will utilize both a legal-dogmatic methodology and a 
comparative analysis in order to establish the current differences in the EU 
and U.S antitrust policies regarding patent pooling.  
 
Initially, using a legal-dogmatic methodology, I will clarify the state of law 
within antitrust policy regarding patent pooling in the separate jurisdictions. 
Firstly investigating the current regulations and case law within EU law, 
followed by a similar description of U.S antitrust law on the area. 
  
Secondly, I will apply a comparative analysis on the two separate 
approaches in anti-trust law regarding patent pooling. My comparative 
analysis will take on a legal-economic perspective, highlighting the different 
views held by the European Commission in comparison with the one held 
by the FTC, meanwhile analysing the actual differences in law and in 
practise.  
 
In 2014, the current regulation regarding licensing of technology (TTBER) 
will expire. Due to this, the commission has recently drafted a new TTBER, 
proposing a change in the approach on patent pools, suggesting a soft safe 
harbour for such agreements. However, the suggested approach is far less 
lenient than US policy, having resulted in comments and suggestions from 
the American Bar Association. An other current event, to be further brought 
up in the analysis, is the debated need for patent pools within biotechnology 
and pharmaceutical industry, the current anti-trust approach on patent pools 
hinders pooling within this sector, something which is regarded a prominent 
problem in the current regulation.  
 
1.4 Disposition 
This thesis will be divided into two main parts, in order to first investigate 
the state of law within EU antitrust law on the area of patent pools followed 
by the same investigation in terms of U.S antitrust law. Besides these two 
main parts, it will be lead off with a descriptive chapter regarding patent 
pools and its main functions. In order to initiate my conclusion, I will give a 
short description of the current situation of patent pools i modern 
technology by describing the need for patent pools in biotechnology. Finally 
the differences identified in the respective legal system will be contrasted in 
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the analysis, in order to suggest a practice for EU antitrust regulation in 
terms of patent pools. 
1.5 Limitations  
I will only focus on one of four Intellectual Property Rights; Patents, and the 
pooling of such rights. I have thus chosen not to cover Trade Marks, 
Copyrights or Designs. I have chosen to focus only on patents since these 
are covered by the Technology Transfer Regulations, the regulation 
excludes other IPRs as not covering the rights to licence technology.  
 
Further I have chosen only to concentrate on patent pools, my first thought 
being to include also cross licenses. But after some time of research I 
realized that covering both would be a to large an area, and the two different 
types of licensing are not treated in the same manner under the TTBER. 
Therefore I decided only to include patent pools. 
 
Additionally, patent pools are viewed as being beneficial and well suited for 
technologies where there is a defined standard. Even if there, as described in 
article 211 in the Technology Transfer Guidelines, “is no inherent link 
between technology pools and standards”, technology pools still often 
support an industry standard. The industry standard facilitates the 
assessment of whether a patent is essential, something that forms the ground 
for determination what patents to include in the pool. However I will touch 
upon industry standards in this thesis but have chosen to excluded a further 
definition of the term since this is too wide an area to examine, and the 
definition in itself in not of importance for the direction that I am aiming for 
in this thesis.5 
 
                                                
5 Kulbaski, J, (2002), 4-5. 
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2 Patent Pools 
 
2.1 Patents and technological 
development 
A patent entitles an inventor the right to exclusively gain from his 
investments in technological development. The patent holder can for a 
certain period of time exclude others from using the patented technology 
and may also do with it whatever he wishes. The possibility to patent an 
invention is in much an incentive for investments in research and 
technological development.6 The protection is however national, meaning 
that an exclusive right covered by a patent in one state does not protect the 
patent holder from infringements in other states, the same within the EU. 
(See. 3.1.1.) 
 
A patent gives a company an exclusive right to the particular item covered 
by the patent. However, this exclusivity does not entitle the patent holder 
the right to use the patented item, but only the right to exclude others from 
using it.7  
 
An inventor of an improvement to existing technology, being granted patent 
protection for his invention, will not have the right to use it without a license 
to use the already existing technology. This is the case if use of the 
improvement technology is reliant also on the use of the existing 
technology. Patent holders can under such circumstances block possible 
improvement of technology by refusing licensing.8 
 
2.2 Blocking patents 
Creation of new products is dependent on fast technological development, 
resulting in an increasing number of patents being issued. The infringement 
on one or many existing patents during the product development process is 
therefore not unlikely. Technological development is in much dependent on 
already existing inventions. Such activities are, as previously mentioned, 
dependent on the granting of licenses from each patent owner having earlier 
contributed to the development of the specific technology.  
 
                                                
6 Korah, V, (2006), p.2.  
7 Raymond D.G, (2001), p. 198.  
8 Korah, V, (2006) p. 1. 
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The current situation is one with many blocking patents, limiting the 
possibility for further development as well as the possibility to obtain a 
license to use a technology while not infringing others. Patented rights are 
often closely linked and in them selves not sufficient in order to create the 
product it was intended for.9 
 
In order to give an example, suppose Company C wanting to produce 
Product C. The key input in order to produce Product C is Product A and 
Product B, the patent rights to those two products is held by two separate 
companies; Company A and Company B. Company C is thus not able to 
produce Product C and neither is Company A or B, since both components 
are necessary. The blocking patents are now hindering the development of 
product C, being of harm both to the potential producers of the product and 
consumers.  
 
A possible solution could be Company A and B cross-licensing the patents 
for Product A and B, doing so both being able to produce Product C. 
Imagine Company C being the only company holding the necessary know-
how for the production. Company C is under such circumstances the only 
company able to produce the product. In order for all companies to enjoy 
possible profit of Product C, Company A and B must license their patents to 
Company C. By creating a patent pool and jointly licensing their patents to 
Company C, Company A and B can avoid loosing out on the profit from 
product C and also favour technological development. The pooling of 
patents will hence limit the problems arising from the web of overlapping 
patents, otherwise blocking the creation of new products.10 
 
 
2.3 The definition of patent pools 
The Commission defines patent pools as follows in article 210 of its’ 
Technology Transfer Guidelines. 
 
“Technology pools are defined as arrangements whereby two or 
more parties assemble a package of technology which is 
licensed not only to contributors to the pool but also to third 
parties. In terms of their structure technology pools can take the 
form of simple arrangements between a limited number of 
parties or elaborate organisational arrangements whereby the 
organisation of the licensing of the pooled technologies is 
                                                
9 Sharpiro, (2001) p. 119-120. 
10 Ibid, p. 123. 
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entrusted to a separate entity. In both cases the pool may allow 
licensees to operate on the market on the basis of a single 
licence.” 11 
 
Two or more companies form a patent pool; the pool is a single entity 
holding an entire group of assembled patents, licensing these as a package to 
third parties. Often a new entity is established to run the licensing process 
but the original patent holders might as well hold the entity.12 
 
 
2.4 Different cathegories of patent pools 
Patent pools can be divided into three categories, contingent on the 
relationship between the patents within the pool. Depending on the type of 
patented technology within the pool, the outcome of the pooling 
arrangement may be largely different. 
 
The first type is a pool with substitute patents, which are so similar that one 
can be replaced with the other and thus fully competing.13 In this 
arrangement the pool creates little value for the creation of new technology 
while also causing higher prices by eliminating competition between 
alternative technologies.14 
 
The second type is pooling of patents that are complementary, meaning that 
they are closely related and within the same area of technology. Joining 
these two patents in a pool results in enlarged value of them, due to the 
increased possibility of developing new technology or new products within 
this area with access to both patented technologies. 
 
The third, and last, type is a patent pool that is a way of solving an issue of 
blocking patents. As described earlier, blocking patents cannot be exercised 
without the patent holders infringing each other’s patents, hindering 
development and improvement and also making the patent insignificant to 
the holder. A pool can be way of solving such blocking positions.15  
 
                                                
11 Commission Guidelines, OJ [2004] C 101/02. 
12 Sharpiro, (2001) p. 127, 134. 
13 Taylor D, (1992), p. 202. 
14 Gilbert, R, (2010), p. 337. 
15 Taylor, D, (1992), p. 202.  
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2.4.1 Essential patents 
It is supported by economical theory that a patent pool should be regarded 
as pro-competitive as long as patents included are of essential value to 
practise the technology standard intended for the pool. Such reasoning 
implies that a rigorous assessment of the essentiality of patents is necessary 
in order to determine which patents to include in a pool.16 When setting up a 
patent pool it is a common strategy to employ an independent patent expert, 
responsible for determining whether patents are essential. This way the 
pooling parties ensure that the pool contain only patents that are individually 
necessary for the intended technology, excluding competing, substitutable 
patents.17 
 
Essential patents are described in the following way by Assistant Attorney 
General Joel Klein in a business review letter, regarding the patent pool 
defining the standard of DVD-ROM and video in 1999. 
 
“Essential patents, by deﬁnition, have no substitutes; one 
needs licenses to each of them in order to comply with the 
standard.”18 
 
As stated in this definition; an essential patent is one that is necessary for 
the specific standard intended for the pool. Inclusion of essential patents 
ensures the pool to function in accordance with its’ intended purpose.19 
 
However, it can be difficult to define patents that are considered perfect 
complements and thus essential for a pool, since the conditions of its 
essentiality can change.20 Additionally it can be of economic benefit to 
include other patents besides those of obvious essentiality to a standard 
since the risk of excluding possible future essential patents might pose a 
threat both on competition as well as the functioning of the pool.  
 
An example where such risks became apparent derives from the MP3-
industry. Within this industry there were earlier no single pool for all patents 
essential for the MP3 technology, instead the ownership of patent rights 
were held by many separate right holders resulting in several issues within 
this field of technology.21 In the case Lucent-Antel MP3, Microsoft believed 
that they by negotiating a package license from Fraunhofer IIS had obtained 
                                                
16 Gilbert, R, (2010), p. 339. 
17 Sharpiro, (2001), p. 134. 
18 Klein, J, Letter to Carey R Ramos, (1999) 
19 Lerner J, Tirole J, (2004), p. 2-3. 
20 Ibid, p. 3. 
21 Gilbert ,R, (2010), p. 339. 
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all necessary IPRs in order to practise MP3 Technology. However, the 
company Lucent-Alcatel brought proceeding regarding patent infringement, 
claiming two of their patents within MP3 Technology had been infringed by 
Microsoft. Lucent-Antel initially won, but the judgment was later 
overturned. Even so, this pose clear example to the effects of excluding 
patents of possible essence within an area of technology.22 
 
 
2.5 The pro-competitive effects of patent 
pools 
Most patent pools are, as described by Joel Klein, Assistant Attorney 
General for Antitrust, intended to have effects that benefit competition. 
These arrangements mostly provide consumers with better products at better 
prices by enabling research and technological development. Pooling 
agreements also give rising companies the possibility to develop products 
within different areas of technology, resulting in a large variety of 
products.23 
 
2.5.1 Lowering transaction costs 
Pooling of patents within a certain area of technology or an industry 
standard facilitates the negotiation process for companies wanting to 
develop a product within the area of technology. A patent pool creates a 
one-stop-shop for patents, providing an opportunity for companies to avoid 
negotiating with every single patent holder within the field in order to 
license all patents desired. As a result transaction costs for multiple 
licensing are reduced.24  
 
2.5.2 Reducing litigation costs  
Patent pools can be way of settling intellectual property disputes between 
parties, providing an alternative to costly litigation processes. Such 
litigations might result in one or more parties loosing large sums as well as 
the right to use the technology subject of the dispute.25 Patent litigations are 
                                                
22 Lucent Tech., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc. (2007). 
23 Klein J, Letter to Garrard R. Beeney, (1997). 
24 Kulbaski, J, (2002), p. 6-7. 
25 Sharpiro, (2001), p. 142.  
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extremely costly and also very uncertain, due to little experience within the 
judicial system in these complex matters. Additionally, there is the risk of 
judges invalidating the patents of both parties.  
 
Given the value inherent in the disputed patented rights, it might be more 
beneficial for the parties to come to an alternative solution to a dispute, 
avoiding the large risks of patent litigation. This opens up for the possibility 
of cross licensing or pooling of patents, since such a solution provides an 
opportunity for both parties to benefit from its patents meanwhile excluding 
the risk of having the disputed patents invalidated.26 
 
Patent pooling often benefits smaller companies, since litigation costs are a 
larger burden for these actors. The possibility of settling infringement 
procedures through pooling of disputed patents strengthens the position of 
smaller companies towards larger firms. Pooling is therefore common 
among smaller firms.27 
  
Similarly, small companies have little ability to obtain all licenses necessary 
from each individual entity since this is too costly; these companies often 
risk patent infringement. A patent pool offering the opportunity to license 
all essential patents through a one-stop-shop can reduce the number of 
companies risking infringement litigations. The chances of infringing a 
patent, due to a complex web of different patents covering a technical area, 
is reduced since a patent pool hopefully will ensure a licensee not having to 
risk patent infringement.28 
 
2.5.3 Clearing blocking patents 
Through overlapping patent rights, important technologies can, as described 
earlier, be blocked. Such blocking positions cannot be solved without a 
licensing agreement between the patent holders and development will thus 
be hindered until a licensing agreement has been entered into. Patent pools 
can offer ways for patent holders to clear several blocking positions 
simultaneously, thus being of great importance to technological 
development. The current web of overlapping patents within many fields of 
technology puts a strain on development, surely justifying pooling of 
blocking patents.29 
 
                                                
26 Carlson, S, (1999), p. 380. 
27 Ibid, p. 382. 
28 Kulbaski J, (2002), p. 7.  
29 Carlson, S, (1999), p. 379. 
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2.5.4 Spreading risk  
Within a pool the royalties from joint patent licensing are spread amongst 
the firms within the pool. The parties will thus share the benefit of 
investments in inventions and consequently the risks of such new 
innovation. By reducing individual risks, incentives for further 
technological development will flourish.30  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
30 Carlson, (1999), p. 381. 
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3 EU antitrust policy on patent 
pools 
 
3.1 The EU antitrust policy on patented 
rights (IPR) 
As earlier stated; an IPR confers an exclusive right upon its holder to 
prevent others from using it without authorization. Such exclusive right 
given to an owner of an IPR is in much conflict with competition law 
incentives, which aims to keeping the market open to all and preventing 
exclusivity.31 However it has been stated by the Commission that there is no 
such conflict of interest, on the contrary IPR and antirust regulations share 
the same goals of enforcing competition and creating consumer welfare, as 
well as giving incentives for innovation.32  
 
It is recognised by the commission that an IPR bestows upon its holder a 
certain legal monopoly since it gives right to exclude others from using an 
innovation. The holder of a patent is therefore by the European Commission 
presumed to enjoy a certain legal monopoly power in terms of its patented 
innovation. Such legal monopoly power can further lead to market power 
and pure monopoly power.33     
 
3.1.1 Free movement of goods 
A patent right is considered a national right, meaning that patent protection 
only applies within the state where protection has been approved. Such 
limitations to intellectual property rights is in obvious conflict with the 
principle of free movement of goods and the open internal market within the 
European Union. In order to escape such conflict the ECJ has adopted the 
doctrine of exhaustion within the Union; once an IPR has been put on the 
European internal market, the right conferred by its holder has been 
exhausted and the right holder can no longer control the sales.34 An 
Intellectual property right put on the market within the European Union can 
thus not be protected from usage due to a national protection of such right.35  
 
                                                
31 Wish, R, (2009), p. 758.  
32 Commission Guidelines, OJ [2004] C 101/02.  
33 Commission evaluation report on the TTBER, 240/96, 3.1(28). 
34 Korah, V, (2006), p. 3. 
35 Wish, R, (2009), p. 757.  
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3.2 Competition rules in the TFEU 
3.2.1 Article 101.1 
Article 101(1) TFEU prohibits agreements that restrict or distort 
competition. Article 101.1 applies to both horizontal and vertical 
agreements, however vertical agreements are often block exempted through 
regulation 2790/99.36  
 
Under art 101(1) agreements that have as their objective or as their effect 
the restriction of competition, are prohibited. Agreements intended to fix 
prices as well as exchange of information of current and future prices, are 
regarded as having as its objective to distort competition. This also applies 
in terms of market-sharing agreements, agreements setting quotas and 
collective exclusive dealing. Further, an agreement conferring export bans 
from one member state to another is also regarded as an agreement with the 
objective of distorting competition. These types of agreements, regarded as 
an infringement by object, are per se considered as an infringement of 
Article 101(1). 
 
Agreements that are not regarded as by object infringing competition law 
must be investigated further, since an actual or potential negative effect on 
competition must be evident in such cases.37 
 
 
3.2.2 Article 101.3 
Article 101.3 TFEU provides a legal exception to Article 101(1), providing 
four conditions to be fulfilled in order for an agreement to be exempted 
from the application of Article 101(1).  
 
The possibility of exemption offered by article 101(3) is based on economic 
efficiency, allowing pro-competitive effects of an agreement to be taken into 
account when evaluating its’ effects on competition. The positive 
economical effects of an agreement are therefore taken into account, since 
gained efficiency might create additional value outweighing possible or 
actual negative effects on competition. The gained benefit must also be of 
                                                
36 Regulation 2790/99 OJ [1999] L 336/21, [2000] 4 CMLR 398. 
37 Wish, R, (2009), p. 82-120. 
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objective value to the community as a whole in order to fulfil the 
requirements.38  
 
The four criterions in order for an agreement to be given a legal exception 
are the following: 
  
1. The agreement must contribute to improvement of production or 
distribution of goods or to promote technological or economic 
progress. 
2. This while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits 
3. The agreement must not impose concerned restrictions on the 
undertakings, which are not indispensible to the attainment of the 
objectives above (1-2). 
4. Further not afford undertakings the possibility of eliminating 
competition in a substantial part of the products in question.39 
 
The conclusion to be drawn is that agreements in ways restricting 
competition might be of such benefit to economic growth or technological 
development that the communal gain justifies restriction of competition. 
The burden of proof for justification in accordance with Article 101(3) lies 
with the undertaking.40 
 
Lastly, exception from the application of article 101(1) will not be granted if 
it would result in an elimination of competition on a substantial part of the 
market, taking into account the market shares of the parties of the agreement 
and the entry barriers on the market.41  
 
 
3.2.3 Block Exemptions    
The Commission has granted a number of block exemptions to the 
application of Article 101(1). Block exemption regulations provide 
undertakings entering into an agreement the certainty not to be declared 
prohibited under Article 101(1). An agreement fulfilling the conditions for 
block exemption is presumed to fulfil the conditions of Article 101(3). 
Undertakings consequently do not have to notify the Commission of their 
agreement, limiting the workload of all parties.42 One type of agreement 
                                                
38 Wish, R, (2009), p. 155. 
39 TFEU,  OJ [2012] C-326/47, art. 101.3. 
40 Wish, R, (2009), p. 151f.  
41 Ibid, p. 159. 
42 Ibid, p. 164  
 
 
19 
being block exempted is technology transfer agreements; patent licensing 
agreements. These are block exempted under the TTBER. 
 
 
3.3 Patent pools under the Technology 
Transfer Block Exemption Regulation 
and Guidelines 
 
3.3.1 Commission regulation 772/2004 
The Commission Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation exempt 
licensing agreements for patents, know-how, software copyright and mixed 
patents from the application of article 101.1 TFEU.43  
 
 Article 2 
 Pursuant to Article 81(3) of the Treaty and subject to the 
provisions of this Regulation, it is hereby declared that Article 
81(1) of the Treaty shall not apply to technology transfer 
agreements entered into between two undertakings permitting the 
production of contract products. 
  
 This exemption shall apply to the extent that such agreements 
contain restrictions of competition falling within the scope of 
Article 81(1). The exemption shall apply for as long as the 
intellectual property right in the licensed technology has not 
expired, lapsed or been declared invalid or, in the case of know-
how, for as long as the know-how remains secret, except in the 
event where the know-how becomes publicly known as a result of 
action by the licensee, in which case the exemption shall apply 
for the duration of the agreement.44 
 
Technology transfer agreements, or licensing agreements will be assumed to 
fulfil the conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU, mainly since these agreements 
usually have the effect of improving economic efficiency and reduce 
inefficiencies in research and development. They further strengthen 
innovation and product market competition. The pro-competitive effects of 
                                                
43 TFEU, OJ [2012] C-326/47, Since the reform Treaty of December 2007, The Treaty of 
the Functioning of the European Union has replaced the Rome Treaty, ad former art 81 is 
now art 101.  
44 TTBER, 772/2004, OJ [2004] L 123, art. 2.  
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licensing agreements are so vast that they must be regarded as outweighing 
the possible anti-competitive effects.45  
 
In the preamble to the TTBER licensing agreements arranging a patent pool 
are excluded from the application of the TTBER, giving that patent pools 
are not block exempted from application of the competition rules of Article 
101(1). 
 
 (7) This Regulation should only deal with agreements where the 
licensor permits the licensee to exploit the licensed technology, 
possibly after further research and development by the licensee, 
for the production of goods or services. It should not deal with 
licensing agreements for the purpose of subcontracting research 
and development. It should also not deal with licensing 
agreements to set up technology pools, that is to say, agreements 
for the pooling of technologies with the purpose of licensing the 
created package of intellectual property rights to third parties.46 
 
3.3.2 The Technology Transfer Guidelines 
The Technology Transfer Guidelines, following the TTBER, provides 
guidance for the application of the TTBER; it is further stated in the 
Guidelines that the block exemption covering license agreements does not 
apply to agreements for the pooling of patents. 
 
Article 212 
Agreements establishing technology pools and setting out 
the terms and conditions for their operation are not, 
irrespective of the number of parties, covered by the block 
exemption. Such agreements are addressed only by these 
guidelines.47  
 
Technology pools are in the Guidelines described by the Commission as 
“arrangements whereby two or more parties assemble an package of 
technology which is licensed not only to contributors to the pool but also to 
third parties”. Stating that in order fulfil the definition of a pool, licensing 
parties must not only license the patents internally within the pool, but also 
make the patents available for third parties. The Commission further states 
that technologies within the pool can be handled either by the members 
themselves, or by a separate party. 
                                                
45 TTBER, 772/2004, OJ [2004] L 123, preamble (5). 
46 Ibid, preamble (7). 
47 Commission Guidelines, OJ [2004] C 101/02, Article 212. 
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Licensing of all patents within the pool is possible through one single 
license.48 The licensing agreements between the pool and third parties are 
block exempted under TTBER and considered similar to any regular 
licensing agreement.49 
 
The Commission also points out the possible restrictions on competition 
inherent in technology pools, stating that such arrangements give raise to 
issues regarding the selection of the technologies included in the pool. Other 
types of licensing agreements do not raise such issues. Due to these specific 
qualities of patent pools, they are excluded from the TTBER and 
consequently possible block exemption from article 101(1) TFEU.50 The 
concerns of the Commission regarding the anti-competitive effect of 
technology pools are described in the following sections. 
 
 
3.3.3 The anti-competitive risks of patent 
pools according to the Commission, as 
described in the Guidelines 
In the Guidelines the Commission points out that a distinction must be made 
between complementing and substitute patents. The difference being that 
two complementary patents are necessary for the carrying out of a standard, 
whereas substitute patents on the other hand can individually serve such 
purpose. Nevertheless, patents might be substitutes in part but at the same 
time regarded as complementary, resulting in firms wanting to license both 
patens even if they partly cover the same technology. Licensing both patents 
might be beneficial in order to ensure future efficiency of the licensing.   
 
Similarly, essential and non-essential technologies must be identified. An 
essential patent has no substitutes and is necessary in order to fulfil the 
purpose of the pool. Essential patents are considered complements since 
they are necessary in order to carry out the purpose of the pool.51  
 
                                                
48 Commission Guidelines, OJ [2004] C 101/02, Article 210. 
49 Ibid, Article 212. 
50 Ibid, Article 212-213. 
51 Ibid, Article 216-218. Van Bael & Bellis, Competition law of the European Community, 
(2005) p. 699-705. 
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3.3.3.1 The anti-competitive risks of including 
substitute patents in a patent pool 
According to the guidelines, inclusion of substitute patents in a pool is as a 
general rule considered an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU, neither 
likely to fulfil the conditions of Article 101(3).   
 
Patent pools entailing substitute patents would likely result in higher royalty 
costs due to reduced price competition among patent holders, putting a 
strain on competition.52 Pooling of substitute patents also risk causing 
collective bundling and price fixing between competitors.53 The 
Commission has therefore settled that inclusion of substitute technologies in 
patent pools shall, as a general rule, be considered an infringement of 
Article 101(1) TFEU. 
 
219. The inclusion in the pool of substitute technologies 
restricts inter-technology competition and amounts to collective 
bundling. Moreover, where the pool is substantially composed 
of substitute technologies, the arrangement amounts to price 
fixing between competitors. As a general rule the Commission 
considers that the inclusion of substitute technologies in the 
pool constitutes a violation of Article 81(1).54  
 
 
3.3.3.2 The anti-competitive risks of including non-
essential patents in a patent pool 
Also the inclusion of non-essential patents is considered likely to infringe 
Article 101(1). Such inclusion may result in the foreclosure of third party 
technologies, eliminating the possibility for competing patent holders to 
license its’ substitute technology, closing them of from the market. 
Important to add is the fact that essential patents are considered having no 
substitutes, consequently meaning that the complementarity of non-essential 
patents is difficult to determine. Inclusion of non-essential patents is 
therefore likely considered anti-competitive.55 The Commission additionally 
suggests that patents should be excluded if they are later made non-essential 
due to further development.56 
 
                                                
52 Commission Guidelines, OJ [2004] C 101/02, Article 217. 
53 Ibid, Article 219. 
54 Ibid, Article 219. 
55 Ibid, Article 221. 
56 Ibid, Article 222.  
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3.3.3.3 Exclusivity and grant back clauses 
A patent pool holding a strong position on the market runs great risk of 
having a negative impact on competition. The Guidelines therefore states 
that pools having such qualities should be open and non-discriminatory, and 
additionally they must not be exclusive, in order to ensure that the pooling 
does not result in foreclosure and anti-competitive effects on the 
downstream markets. 
 
The restriction on exclusivity clauses accounts for all pooling arrangements, 
inhibiting agreements restricting parties’ rights to license its patents outside 
the pool. Such non-competitive clauses could obstruct competition by 
foreclosing third parties and preventing technological development.57 
 
Grant back obligations are however important in order to ensure possible 
development and improvement of the technologies within the pool, 
safeguarding pools not to become obsolete. Obligations on the parties must 
nevertheless be non-exclusive, granting parties the right to further license its 
innovations outside the pool. Grant back obligations must only cover 
essential improvements.58 
 
3.3.3.4 Exchange of sensitive information 
On oligopolistic markets (markets with few actors and very similar 
products) exchange of sensitive information among parties is regarded as 
possibly causing detriment to competition. The information regarded as 
most sensitive is pricing information, output data or other strategic 
information. In order to ensure avoidance of collusion between pooling 
parties they must guarantee the safeguarding of such information, making 
sure that sensitive information is exchanged in a way keeping it unavailable 
for actors in the separate firms. In order for the pool to operate, it might be 
necessary to use an independent expert or licensing body, handling all 
necessary strategic information such as licensing fees in order to calculate 
royalty fees.59 
 
3.3.3.5 Protection of invalid patents 
Patent pools might protect invalid patents since an overview of all pooled 
patent is sometimes difficult. As a result licensees run the risk of paying 
royalty fees for patents no longer valid, as well as higher royalties due to a 
large portfolio entailing invalid patents. Supplementary, this can limit 
                                                
57Commission Guidelines, OJ [2004] C 101/02, Article 223-227. 
58 Ibid, Article 228 
59 Ibid, Article 234. 
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technological development by protecting information of unpatented fields of 
technology open for further development. 
 
3.3.4 Summary of the anti-competitive risks 
A Patent pool might restrict competition in two ways according to the 
reasoning of the Commission: Firstly, a patent pool might result in a price 
fixing cartel, due to pooling firms engaging in joint selling. In cases of 
substitute patens included in a pool the risks of a price fixing cartel are vast. 
Secondly, a patent pool can cause foreclosure on the market, since pools 
often support industry standards. Standard setting and use of complying 
pools might cause foreclosure of alternative technologies since patents not 
included in the pool become less sought for.60 
 
3.3.5 The operation of the pool  
In order for the pool to operate in a pro-competitive way it is most 
beneficial to involve external experts in the creation and operation of the 
pool.  An independent expert can ensure inclusion only of patents fulfilling 
the essentiality and validity requirements. In the assessment of anti-
competitive effects, the Commission will take into account the degree of 
independence of an external operator, which similarly accounts for the 
dispute resolution agreed up on between the pooling parties.61 
 
 
3.4 Case law 
3.4.1 The DVD technology pool 
On May 12 1999, the companies Hitachi Ltd, Matsushita Electric Industrial 
Co., Ltd, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Time Warner Inc., Toshiba 
Corporation and Victor Company of Japan Limited (JVC) notified the 
Commission of a patent licensing programme, pooling the patents essential 
for the DVD62 technology. 
 
Through the arrangement Toshiba was granted a worldwide non-exclusive 
license for all patents essential to the DVD technology. Toshiba agreed to 
                                                
60 Wish, R, (2009), p. 782-783. 
61 Commission Guidelines, OJ [2004] C 101/02, Article 232-233, 235. 
62 Digital Versatile Disc 
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grant licenses to any other firm with a wish to implement the DVD 
specifications, such licensing to third parties being worldwide and non-
exclusive.  Hitachi Ltd and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd would 
also work as licensing agents for the pool.  
 
The standard licence contract between Toshiba and third parties contains the 
following provisions: 
 . under the terms of this licence, the licensee gains a worldwide non-
exclusive right to make, have made, use, sell or dispose of DVD-
video players, DVD-ROM drive, DVD decoders and DVD discs 
conforming to the DVD specifications under all the essential 
patents owned by the parties to the arrangement; 
 . the licensee has the option to negotiate for any essential patents and 
the other related patents separately with any member of the 
arrangement which is then required to grant such licence on fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms; 
 . all of the licensees under the scheme will be informed if any other 
party is granted more favourable royalty terms, so that their 
licences may be amended to reflect those terms; 
 . the licensee must grant a licence on ‘fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory terms’ to any essential patents it holds to any 
member of the arrangement and to all other licensees under this 
scheme; 
 . if the licensee takes court action against one of the members of the 
arrangement for breach of an essential patent that the licensee 
holds, and if it refuses to grant the member a licence on fair and 
reasonable terms for that patent, the member can terminate the 
licensee's rights to the patents that the member has given to the 
pool63 
 
The parties each held blocking patents, hindering any of the parties from 
applying their patents for DVD technology without infringing patents held 
by the other companies. The arrangement to pool the patents essential for 
the DVD technology would dissolve blocking positions as well as making 
the joint patents available for third parties wishing to engage in DVD 
technology. 
 
                                                
63  Notification of a licensing system, DVD Patent Licensing Program, OJ [1999] C 242/04, 
§ 4.  
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Pooling of the patents would result in DVD technology being spread quickly 
since all essential technology was made available through one single 
license. The pool was open to all patentees holding patents deemed essential 
for the DVD technology.64  
 
The DVD technology pool was granted an exemption from application of 
the competition rules. In its’ assessment the Commission took into account 
the possible effects of promoting technological and economic progress since 
the pool would enable fast introduction of DVD technology. The 
Commission was of the opinion that the arrangement did not contain any 
“unnecessary or excessive restriction on competition” instead as an effect 
having reduced transaction costs for firms engaging in development of DVD 
technology. Consumer benefits were also apparent since the pool would 
result in possible enjoyment of DVD technology at shorter time and at lower 
costs.65  
 
3.4.2 The 3G Mobile Services Pool 
In order to produce 3G-equipment a certain standard, the IMT-standard, was 
set. The standard entailed five different techniques, each possible to use 
when developing 3G-equipment.  
 
On the 14th of July 2000 the companies forming the 3G Pools66; 3G3P, 
presented to the Commission a number of agreements regarding the 
functioning of the patent pools. In order to best preserve the competition 
within 3G-technology the parties decided on forming five separate pools, 
each covering different techniques important for 3G-equipment. The patents 
included in each pool where regarded essential for the technology.  
 
In their evaluation of patent pools the Commission took into account 
essentiality of patents included and whether the licensing of the patents 
would be taking place on non-discriminatory grounds. Furthermore, the 
Commission evaluated the safeguarding of sensitive information between 
the parties in order to avoid collusion. Cared for was also the regulation of 
royalty costs. Producers of 3G-products should not have to pay royalty costs 
for other than the required patents; the pooling could otherwise cause 
                                                
64Van Beal & Bellis, (2005), p. 653f. 
65 Ibid, p. 654. 
66 Alcatel, Cegetel, Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute Korea 
(”ETRI”), France Telecom, Fujitsi, Royal KPN N.V., LG Information and 
Communications, Matsushita, Mitsubishi Electric, NEC, NTT DoCoMo, Robert Bosch 
GmbH, Samsung Electronics, Siemens AG, SK Telecom, Sonera Corporation, Sony and 
Telecom Italia Mobile. 
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lowered incentives for further development within the area of 
telecommunication.  
 
Lastly, the Commission took into account the fact that a number of large 
actors on the market also holding important patents for the 3G technologies, 
Ericsson, Nokia, Motorola and Qualcomm, were not part of the pooling 
arrangement. Indicating that the pools would not have an anti-competitive 
impact on the market for 3G-technologies. The pooling arrangements for 
3G-technologies were due to the above not considered to infringe EU 
competition rules.67 
  
 
3.5 The 2013 proposal for a revised 
Technology Transfer Block Exemption 
Regulation 
Under the current legislation regarding Technology Transfer agreements, 
patent pools are assessed on a case-to-case basis, being excluded from the 
application of the TTBER. The formation of a technology pool must 
therefore be assessed according to the above-described factors, such as the 
transparency during the formation of a pool, involvement of experts, the 
selection of patents included as well as the actions taken to ensure non-
exchange of sensitive information. 
 
The Commission proposed, on February 20, 2013, a revision of the current 
TTBER to enter into force on April 30, 2014 when the current Regulation 
expires.68 Following the new draft for the Regulation the Commission has 
also drafted new Technology Transfer Guidelines. 
 
In the drafted Guidelines the Commission proposes a “safe harbour” to be 
applied in the assessment of technology pools in order to clarify the 
conditions under which a technology pool is not likely to fall under the 
application of article 101.1 TFEU.  
 
Safe harbour  
(244) The creation and operation of the pool generally falls 
outside Article 101(1) irrespective of the market position of the 
parties if all the following conditions are fulfilled:  
                                                
67 Press release, IP/02/1651, (2002)  
68 Draft TTBER, C (2013) 921 draft. 
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(a) participation in the standard and pool creation process is 
open to all interested parties;  
(b) sufficient safeguards are adopted to ensure that only 
essential technologies (which therefore by necessity are also 
complements) are pooled;  
(c) sufficient safeguards are adopted to ensure that exchange 
of sensitive information is restricted to what is necessary for 
the creation and operation of the pool;  
(d) the pooled technologies are licensed into the pool on a 
non-exclusive basis;  
(e) the pooled technologies are licensed out to all potential 
licensees on FRAND terms  
(f) the parties contributing technology to the pool and the 
licensees are free to challenge the validity and the essentiality 
of the pooled technologies, and;  
(g) the parties contributing technology to the pool and the 
licensee remain free to develop competing products and 
technology.69  
 
The conditions are intended to provide guidance for the assessment of patent 
pools. Pools fulfilling these requirements should be considered to fall 
outside of Article 101(1) without being assessed on a case-to-case basis. 
 
Under the drafted TTBER, patent pools are not fully exempted from the 
application of article 101(1). Nevertheless, the Guideline provides a soft 
safe harbour for such agreements, simplifying the structuring of a pool in 
order to be regarded as pro-competitive. According to an article written by 
Peter Alexiadis70, the Commission has indicated that an even further 
acceptance of patent pools is possible, widening the scope of the safe 
harbour in order to possibly accept inclusion of non-essential patents.  
                                                
69 Draft Commission Guidelines, C (2013) 924 article 244. 
70 Peter Alexiadis, (2013). 
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4 American antitrust policy on 
patent pools  
4.1 The U.S antitrust law 
The task to enforce the competition rules in the U.S is held by the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC). The fundamental grounds for antitrust law is 
built up by three bodies of law passed by Congress; the Sherman Act, 
passed in 1890, the Federal Commission Act and the Clayton Act.71  
 
The Sherman Act prohibits agreements or other acts putting a restraint on 
trade additionally prohibiting monopolization and conspiracy.  Agreements 
or partnerships restraining trade are deemed unlawful, although positive 
effects of such agreements or partnerships will be taken into account 
possibly justifying anti-competitive agreements. Still, some acts of 
competitors are considered of such harmful nature never to be justified by 
economic gain. These acts are in accordance with U.S case law regarded as 
“per se”72 violations and will under all circumstance be prohibited.  
 
Enforcement under the Sherman Act is possible both under civil- and 
criminal law; the law is thus enforced by the Department of Justice, not the 
FTC. Prosecution under Criminal Law is very limited and even though a 
penalty of up to ten years in prison is possible, penalty payments are most 
often applied. Penalties can amount up to either $100 million for a 
corporation ($1 million for an individual) or twice the amount gained from a 
conspiracy or lost by the victim. 
 
1. Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty Every 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be 
illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or 
engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared 
to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on 
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding 
$10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, 
$350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or 
by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.73    
                                                
71 FTC, the Antitrust Laws, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/antitrust/antitrust_laws.shtm, 2013-11-
14.  
72 Compare to restricion by object in EU law. 
73 The Sherman Antitrust Act (1890), Section 1. 
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Only the FTC enforces the Federal Trade Commission Act. Violations of 
the Sherman Act are also violations under the FTC Act, meaning that the 
FTC act is applicable on anti-competitive agreements parallel to the 
Sherman Act. Supplementary, the FTC Act also covers other activities 
harmful to competition, thus having a much wider scope. 
 
The Clayton Act prohibits activities not covered by the Sherman Act, such 
as mergers and acquisitions having anti competitive effects. Firms are 
required to notify the government of such activities before finalising their 
transactions. The Clayton Acts further prohibits discriminatory pricing and 
allowances.74 
 
 
4.2 The U.S antitrust policy on patent 
rights, the US Guidelines for Licensing 
of Intellectual Property  
A patented right in the US gives its’ holder the right to exclude others from 
using or selling the patented right within the U.S. A patent is valid for 
seventeen years from the date of issue. In order to gain protection an 
invention must fulfil the requirements of novelty, being non-obvious and 
useful. A patented right also hinders others besides the patent holder from 
using the patented right in further creation. The U.S IP Laws and Antitrust 
laws both share, as does the EU policies, the incentive to promote 
innovation and enhance consumer welfare.75 
 
The Federal Trade Commission and the US Department of Justice issued in 
1995 Guidelines stating the antitrust enforcement policy in regards to IPR. 
The Guidelines provide a clear indication on the approach held by the FTC 
and the U.S DoJ on the anti-competitive issues inherent in licensing 
agreements. Still, it does not give the whole picture; court judgements and 
antitrust law enforcement still apply as ultimate law.76  
 
Antitrust infringements involving IPRs is dealt with in no other way by the 
DoJ or the FTC than other infringements.77 Even so, the specific 
                                                
74 FTC, the Antitrust Laws, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/antitrust/antitrust_laws.shtm, 2013-11-
14. 
75 U.S Antitrust Guidelines of intellectual Property, (1995), article 1.  
76 Ibid, article 1.1, paragraph 1.  
77 Ibid, article 2.2(a). Klein, J, Cross-Licensing and Antitrust Law, (1997), p. 3.  
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circumstances on the IP market are taken into account as with any other 
market.78 As mentioned, the holder of a patent is given the right to exclude 
others from using it and is therefore an exclusive right. Such exclusivity can 
be compared with any other form of private property; it can also cause 
anticompetitive effects. 
 
A patent holder can under certain circumstances, in lack of other potential or 
actual substitutes for the invention, hold significant market power. Despite 
this, the holding of an IPR does not constitute a presumption of market 
power following case law. In Abbott Laboratories v. Brennan from 199179, 
the court stated that no presumption of market power could be made from 
the possession of an IPR. In the case Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 
2 v. Hyde it was stated that a patent holder has no market power in case of 
other substitute patents being available on the market.80   
 
Clearly stating the above, the U.S DoJ and The FTC confirms in the 
Guidelines as a general rule in the application of antirust law on IPRs that 
possession of an IPR does not presume market power.81 More, the agencies 
state that market power or a monopoly does not in itself constitute a 
violation of antitrust laws.82 
 
Under the U.S Guidelines there is, similarly to the EU block exemption, a 
“safety zone” for licensing agreements. The purpose is to promote 
innovation by creating a level of certainty for firms setting up licensing 
arrangement in order to enable further development. The safety zone will 
apply to licensing agreements not including restrictions “per se”83 infringing 
competition rules as well as agreements between parties with a market share 
of less than twenty per cent of the relevant market.  
 
 
4.3 Patent pools under the US Guidelines 
for Licensing Intellectual Property 
Under the US Guidelines certain potential anti-competitive effects can be 
identified; risks of collective pricing and output restraint like for instance 
                                                
78 U.S Antitrust Guidelines of intellectual Property, (1995), article 2.1, paragraph 3 
79 Abbott Laboratories v. Brennan, (1991) 
80 Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, (1984) 
81 U.S Antitrust Guidelines of intellectual Property, (1995), article 2. 2.0(b). 
82 Ibid, (1995), article 2.2. 
83 The Sherman Act (1890) section 1, Automatically condemned as anticompetitive, can be 
compared with the hard core restrictions in EU competition law. 
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joint marketing or coordinated output restriction. If a patent pool has any 
such effect it can be deemed unlawful under antitrust regulation. Yet, if a 
pool is considered efficiency enhancing or in other ways beneficial for 
economic integration, anti-competitive effects can be out weighed.  
  
Exclusion of patent holders might be regarded anti-competitive if the patent 
holder as a result will have no ability to effectively compete on the market. 
The U.S DoJ and the FTC will under such circumstances evaluate the net 
effects of the limitations in the pooling agreement, assessing whether 
limiting participation is necessary in order for the pool to function and if it 
promotes development of the pooled technologies. 
 
Grant back clauses in an agreement between pooling parties must also be 
evaluated do to the possible anticompetitive effects. Such clauses are often 
beneficial if the grant backs are non-exclusive, since a patent pool might 
become obsolete in case of new technology being kept outside the pool. 
However, there is a risk of discouraging research and development among 
parties, in cases of grant back clauses forcing members to license future 
inventions to the other parties or forcing members to grant licenses at 
minimal costs. Under such circumstances parties might free ride on the 
inventions and investment of other members, discouraging further research 
and development among all parties.84 
 
If patented rights within a pool are close substitutes, there is a likely risk of 
royalties increasing due to the large concentration of a specific technology 
within the pool. According to example 9 of the US guidelines, the increase 
in prices must be compared to the possible efficiency gain of inclusion of 
substitute patents. Assessment of patent pools under antitrust laws is done in 
accordance with the rule of reason; anti-competitive effects balanced against 
the efficiency gains, in order to determine whether a patent pool shall be 
permitted under antitrust laws.85    
 
All aggregation of patents in a patent pool must undergo an antitrust 
analysis, in order for the DoJ to examine all competitive benefits and 
possible risks, before approving a joint licensing.86 The FTC and the U.S 
DoJ has, according to Learner and Tirole’s Efficient Patent Pools, treated 
patent pools in a very favourable way in application of antitrust laws. Patent 
                                                
84 U.S Antitrust Guidelines of intellectual Property, (1995), article 5.5. 
85 U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual 
Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition (2007), chapter 3, IV. Klein, J, 
Cross-Licensing and Antitrust Law, (1997), p. 4. Under the Sherman Act, section 1, a few 
acts of competitors fall under the “per se” rules, automatically condemned as 
anticompetitive, other acts is assessed according to the rule of reason.  
86 Klein, J, Letter to Garrard R. Beeney, (1998), p. 9. 
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pools are mainly considered beneficial both in the interest of intellectual 
property owners and consumers.87 There is no mention in the Guidelines of 
inclusion of substitutable patents being an anticompetitive issue. Richard J 
Gilbert further evaluates this in his article on the history of patent pools, 
stating that courts in the U.S have historically given very little notice to the 
competitive relationship between patents within in a pool. The main focus 
has been on the existence of downstream restrictions in agreements between 
the licensing parties.88 
 
 
4.4 Anti-competitive concerns of the U.S 
Department of Justice and the Federal 
Trade Commission  
4.4.1 Substitute patents 
As mentioned above, the FTC and the U.S Court of Justice have in most 
earlier cases given very little attention to the competitive relationship 
between patents. The Guidelines only states:  
 
The Agencies recognize that intellectual property licensing 
allows firms to combine complementary factors of 
production and is generally pro-competitive89. 
 
The FTC and the DoJ examines the issue of substitutable patents further in 
its report from 2007. In this report agreeing on the fact that inclusion of 
substitute patents generally pose a greater strain on competition than 
inclusion of complementary patents. Inclusion of substitute patents will 
likely cause high prices or price-fixing. Yet, the FTC and the DoJ states that 
possible efficiency gains of including substitute patents must also be 
assessed in order to determine whether such inclusion should be prohibited 
or not. Inclusion of substitute patents might be necessary in order for the 
pool to fully comply with the intended standard. 
 
Regarding essential patents, the method for determining essentiality has 
been non-consistent throughout history. In the MPEG-2 case the court 
investigated only the patents technical essentiality, whereas the court in the 
DVD case only examined the economical essentiality of the patents in order 
                                                
87 Lerner, J, Tirole, J, (2004), p. 2. 
88 Gilbert, R, (2004), p. 24.  
89 U.S Antitrust Guidelines of intellectual Property, (1995), article 2.0.  
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for the pool to function. In the report from 2007 it is stated that if an 
essentiality test is properly applied this should ensure that no substitute 
patents are included, however not defining the proper way of assessing 
essentiality.90 Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein (cited also in 2.1.1) 
defines essential patents as follows:  
 
“Essential patents, by definition, have no substitutes; one 
needs licenses to each of them in order to comply with the 
standard”91  
 
4.4.2 Exclusive and non-exclusive licenses 
Exclusivity clauses hinder patent holders from licensing its patents outside 
the pool, possibly reducing incentives for further development. Licensing 
outside the pool enables other inventors to use patented technology separate 
from the other patents in the pool and for other purposes than development 
in compliance with the set industry standard.  
 
The FTC and the DoJ has expressed that there are possible pro-competitive 
benefits of exclusive licensing, such as creating an incentive for licensing of 
complementary patents. Most patent pools however apply non-exclusive 
agreements. Still, it is not clearly expressed by the FTC and the DoJ that 
exclusive agreements under all circumstances are anti-competitive.92 
 
4.4.3 Grant backs 
In the Antitrust Guidelines for IPRs, a grant back is defined as “an 
agreement by which a licensee extends to the licensor the right to use the 
licensee’s improvements to the licensed technology”93. In the context of 
pooling arrangements obliging patent holders to license all improvement to 
the pool.  
 
Grant backs might have as an effect to lower the incentive to further develop 
a licensed patent technology since the right to an improvement can not be 
enjoyed in full by its’ inventor. However, the report from 2007 points out 
                                                
90 U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual 
Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition (2007), chapter 3. D, 1. 
91 Klein, J, Letter to Carey R. Ramos, (1999). 
92 U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual 
Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition (2007), chapter 3. D, 2. 
93 U.S Antitrust Guidelines of intellectual Property, (1995). 
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that non-exclusive grant backs limited only to essential improvements run 
very little risk of having anti-competitive effects.94  
 
4.4.4 Access to information 
Firms forming a patent pool are most often competitors. For this reason 
collusion is possible if an exchange of sensitive information takes place 
between the parties. Such collusion can result in price coordination and 
lower the incentive of research and development. In order to prevent this, an 
independent administrator can be given the task of handling the information 
from each firm in order to set royalty prices and other tasks where sensitive 
information must be exchanged. Other mechanisms for protection of each 
firm’s sensitive information can be used in order to limit the access to 
information of other parties.95 
 
4.4.5 Request for partial licenses from a pool 
On some occasions licensees have no need for all licenses within a pool, 
possibly having licensed some of the patents earlier or simply not intending 
to use all patents offered for joint licensing. The possibility of licensing only 
part of the portfolio cannot be guaranteed since the FTC and the U.S DoJ do 
not identify an obvious strain on competition in agreements offering only 
packaged licensing. The possibility to license directly from the licensors is 
considered being a sufficient alternative to the possibility of partial licensing 
from the pool, even if this might result in marginally higher transaction 
costs.96  
 
 
4.5 Case Law relating to patent pools  
4.5.1 The early approach to patent pools 
In the very beginning of patent pool creation, patented rights where given a 
dominant position towards federal antitrust law, first evident in a case from 
1902, E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co97. Six different firms 
                                                
94 U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual 
Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition (2007), chapter 3. D, 3. 
95 Ibid, p.4. 
96 Ibid, chapter 3, D, 6. 
97 E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902) 
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gathered their eighty-five patents for float-spring tooth harrows in a pool. 
The patent pool grew, finally covering ninety percent of the market of float-
spring tooth harrows. The terms of the license agreement fixed uniform 
price schedules for licensees. The court stated that patent holders should 
enjoy an absolute freedom in terms of selling his inventions, regardless of 
results such as fixed prices or monopoly. The court thus clearly stated the 
dominance of patent law and patented rights in matters involving antitrust 
concerns.98  
 
Patent pools enabled collusion up until 191299 when the Supreme Court for 
the first time broke up a patent pool due to the company Standard 
Manufacturing Co.’s activities forcing participants to withhold a minimum 
sales price. The Supreme Court concluded that the extensive rights given to 
patent holders had been stretched to far since the Sherman Act imposed 
limits on the abuse of patent rights.100  
 
The ruling in Standard Manufacturing resulted in a change of agenda in U.S 
Courts; from that point on they kept a restrictive approach towards patent 
pools. This approach was was confirmed also by the ruling in Hartford-
Empire Co. v. United States. Hartford-Empire Co. controlled an extensive 
glass-manufacturing cartel built up by the pooling of patents covering gob-
fed glass-blowing process and cross-licensing patents to companies holding 
patents covering the competing suction glass-blowing process. Through this 
system, all relevant patents for glass blowing were assembled under the roof 
of the Hartford-Empire, using its’ powers to force other competitors to sell 
their relevant patents to the pool. The pool thus provided licenses to ninety-
four per cent of the U.S market for glass production, keeping very high 
licensing fees. The Court ruling resulted in patent pools being obliged to 
license its’ patents at standard royalties without discriminatory or restrictive 
terms. The strict approach held by the DoJ resulted in a decline in the 
number of patent holders entering into pooling agreements during the 
second half of the 20th century. 101 
 
4.5.1.1 The Manufacturers Aircraft Assosiation 
In April 1917, around the time for the U.S entry into the World War I, the 
U.S Government had an interest in airplane manufacturing. The 
Government was at the time a large consumer of such technology and 
interested in further development of the airplane industry. The industry was 
                                                
98 Gilbert, R, (2004), p. 2. Carlson, S, (1999), p. 373. 
99 Standart Sanitary Manufacturing Co. V. United States, (1912). 
100 Carlson, S, (1999), p. 374.  
101 Hartford-Empire Co. V. United States, 323 U.S 386 (1945). 
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in its’ very beginning and the first patent holder; Wright-Martin Aircraft 
Corp (holder of the Wright brothers basic patent), was blocking all other 
aspiring manufacturers. Only one competing patent holder existed, Curtiss 
Aeroplane & Motor Corp., also held blocking patents. The two companies 
where demanding extremely high royalties for their patents, amounting to 
very large costs for the U.S government in order to produce the amount of 
airplanes desired.  
 
In order to limit the unreasonably large costs and to make possible the 
production of airplanes, an advisory committee was set up, recommending a 
formation of a patent pool. The pool was set up in July 1917 and members 
granted non-exclusive licenses to all parties of the pool. All members where 
obliged to license all necessary patents to the pool in order to enable all 
airplane production through one license. A flat rate was paid for each plane 
produced.   
 
From an anti-competitive perspective, the Attorney General102 declared that 
the pro-competitive effects of the joint licensing were so vast that anti-
competitive effects were outweighed. Since the pool was created during 
wartime, a period where the U.S government where in desperate need of 
airplane technology, it must be taken into account that such interest had an 
impact on the assessment of the pool. Under normal circumstances the pool 
would likely have been regarded as limiting innovation incentives among its 
members since the pool put an obligation on all members to grant all new 
innovation to the pool with no repayment.103   
  
 
4.5.2 The current approach to patent pools 
 
In the late 1990s the FTC and the U.S DoJ again approached patent pools by 
publishing the U.S Guidelines concerning antitrust for IPRs and taking on 
cases concerning the lawfulness of patent pools (4.7). Doing so setting a 
new standard for the approach towards patent pools in U.S antitrust law, 
trying to assess the positive and negative effects of such arrangements.104     
 
                                                
102 Klein, J, Cross Licensing and Antitrust Law, (1997), p. 170-171.  
103 Ibid, p. 5-11. 
104 Carlson, S, (1999), p. 373-375. 
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4.5.2.1 The MPEG 2 Pool 
In 1997 the Trustees of Colombia University, Fujitsu Limited, General 
Instruments Corp., Lucent Technologies Inc., Matsushita Electric Industrial 
Co. Ltd, Mitsubishi Electric Corp., Philips Electronics N.V., Scientific-
Atlanta Inc. and Sony Corp proposed to jointly license their patents through 
a commonly owned agent; MPEG LA. 
 
The intention of the proposed patent pool was to gather all licenses essential 
for compliance with the MPEG-2 compression technology standard. The 
patent portfolio would consist of 27 patents, all identified by an independent 
patent expert sponsored by the firms responsible for the development of the 
standard. The expert had studied of over 800 patents, ultimately identifying 
27 patents held by the above firms, covering all essential technology. 
 
Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein expresses the position held by the 
U.S DoJ in his business review letter.105 The DoJ had primarily examined 
the validity and competitive relationship of the patents included, since 
inclusion of invalid or expired patents will not be accepted under antitrust 
regulation. It is further expressed in the business review letter that inclusion 
of competing patents and joint licensing of them might raise anticompetitive 
concerns. However, efficiency gains of such licensing are likely, in such 
case possibly justifying anti-competitive risks.  
 
The Assistant Attorney General concluded that both the fact that the pool is 
set up by an independent expert as well as the inclusion only of patents 
essential to the MPEG-2 standard, gives assurance of the pro-competitive 
effect of the pool. The involving of an independent further supported this 
conclusion.   
 
The grant back clause in the agreement obliges licensees to non-exclusively 
license essential patents to the pool. Sine the grant back obligation is limited 
to essential patents, it is not regarded to limit incentives for innovation in a 
distinctive way, but instead keeping actors on the market from restraining 
development by excluding others from its essential patent.   
 
For the above reasons the Department of Justice stated that they saw no 
reason for initiating an antitrust enforcement against the joint licensing, 
since most part of the terms of agreement served to protect competition.106    
 
                                                
105 Klein, J, Letter to Garrard R. Beeney, (1997). 
106 Ibid, (1997). 
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4.5.2.2 The 3C DVD Pools 
Similar to the patent pool for the DVD-standard approved by the European 
Commission, Philips Electronics N.V, Sony Corporation of Japan and 
Pioneer Electronic Corporation of Japan, formed a pool (3C DVD-pool) 
complying with the specification of the DVD-standard. The pooling 
arrangement was made up in a way making Pioneer the licensor, to whom 
the other parties licensed patents necessary for compliance with the DVD-
standard107. Pioneer, contrary to the independent licensor in the MPEG-2 
pool, licensed out all patents.  
 
The Department of Justice issued a business review letter on December 16, 
1998, examining the validity of the patents within the pool and the 
essentiality of them in order to comply with the DVD standard. It is stated in 
the terms of agreements that a patent should be necessary (as a practical 
matter) in order be included in the pool. The Department of Justice 
interpreted the term “necessary (as a practical term)” as being sufficiently 
restrictive regarding substitute patents.  
 
Pioneer ran the administration of the pool instead of an independent 
administrator. The parties had agreed on contractual commitment for the 
licensor to remain independent, and according to the DoJ the commitment 
was sufficient in order for the pool to function in accordance with antitrust 
regulation.108 Regarding the grant back provisions, this was in much very 
similar to the one applied in the MPEG-pool, obliging only holders of 
essential patents to grant licenses to the pool.109  
 
4.5.2.3 The 6C DVD Pool 
The Department of Justice issued a second business review letter regarding 
pooling of patents for compliance with the DVD-standard in June 1999, 
between the parties Toshiba, Hitachi, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Time Warner 
and Victor Company of Japan. The joint licensor of the pool was Toshiba, 
collecting non-exclusive licenses from the five other parties. Patents 
included were defined as “necessarily infringed” and “for which there were 
no other realistic alternative for implementing the DVD Standard 
specification”, interpreted as patents essential for the DVD standard.  The 
essentiality test was carried out by an expert appointed by the pool, also 
responsible for reviewing the continued essentiality of included patents. The 
                                                
107 DVD-Video or DVD-ROM standard.  
108 Klein, J, Letter to Garrard R. Beeney, (1998), p. 11.12.   
109 Ibid, p. 14.  
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6C DVD Pool included a similar grand back clause as the one applied in the 
3C DVD pool and the MPEG-pool.110 
 
4.5.2.4 The Summit-VISX Pool 
In contrast to the MPEG-2 pool and the patent pools in accordance with the 
DVD-standard, the pooling of patents held by Summit Technology Inc. and 
VISX Inc. was considered to be in violation of antitrust law. The pool 
gathered patents used for laser eye surgery technology: Photorefractive 
keratectomy (PRK). 
 
The pool was considered anti-competitive due to its’ activities joining 
competing patents in order to share the profits of all use of laser eye surgery 
technology. Summit and VISX was the only two companies holding patents 
approved for PRK technology, hence the joining of the two companies 
competing patents made licensing of the technology from any other party 
impossible111 During the six year-long existence of the patent pool no third-
party licenses were issued, instead users of the technology were charged 250 
dollars for each single procedure performed with PRK-technology.112 
 
The demand of PRK-technology was at the time large and the market was 
growing fast. The illegal joint licensing of Summit and VISX cost 
consumers millions of dollars due to price fixing and reduced competition 
on the market for laser eye surgery.  
 
The patent pool was dissolved in 1998 through a settlement with proposed 
orders from the FTC. The pool was regarded to have eliminated competition 
by fixing and raising prices and eliminating incentives for further licensing 
or competition between the firms. Summit and VISX was the only two 
companies on the market to have gained approval for the PRK lases system, 
thus the only companies able to license out patents in the field.113 
 
                                                
110U.Ss Dep’t of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm’n Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual 
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4.6 The American Bas Association’s view 
on EU antitrust policy on patent pools 
and the current draft 
The American Bar Association, by request from the Commission, gave their 
opinion on the Commission’s TTBER and the Guidelines. The task was 
directed to the Section of Antitrust Law and the Section of International 
Law within the Bar Association. The Commission requested comments 
based upon the U.S experience in the field of antitrust law and IP law, and 
the development and practice in these matters in order to assist in the 
Commission’s evaluation of the current EU Regulation114. The aim being to 
further refine and harmonize the approach on technology transfer 
agreements in the EU and the U.S, since the current Regulation expires in 
April 2014. 
 
Specifically, the Sections recommend that the Commission  
 
• Strengthen the analysis used to define competitors, particularly where 
two parties occupy blocking positions to one another (Section II.A); 
  
• Reconsider the TTBER’s and Guidelines’ singular focus on market 
share thresholds, expanding the focus to include consideration of the 
number of alternative R&D efforts instead of market share (Section 
II.B);  
 
• Encourage a more lenient view of grant-backs, especially those 
involving severable improvements (Section III.A)  
 
• Clarify certain aspects of the guidelines on settlements and non-
assertion agreements (Section III.B);  
 
• Encourage an effects-based analysis of the inclusion of substitutes in 
technology pools and offer guidance on the circumstances in which 
pool members can respond to patent assertions by third parties 
(Section III.C);  
 
• Offer guidance on the treatment of agreements outside the scope of 
the TTBER, focusing in particular on the distinction between hardcore 
and non-hardcore restrictions, and on field of use limitations (Section 
III.D).  
 
                                                
114 TTBER, OJ [1996] L 031, 240/96. 
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4.6.1 Inclusion of non-essential patents 
The Bar Association pointed out the fact that there in the EU Guidelines is a 
presumption of substitute technologies in a pool constitutes a violation of 
antitrust regulation, Article 101.1 TFEU. The Bar Association proposed that 
an application of an effects-based analysis on pooling arrangements 
including possible substitute patents to be a more beneficial approach than 
excluding all substitute patents. The Bar Association pointed out, in order to 
strengthen its’ argument, the fact that determination of substitutability of 
patents can be difficult115, possibly resulting in exclusion of patents first 
thought to be substitutes later appearing to be essential for the compliance 
with a technology standard. 
 
The Bar Association was of the opinion that a patent pool fulfilling the 
requirements of article 222(b) in the EU Guidelines; making available 
individual licensing of pooled patents, to ensures the availability of its’ 
patents for third party licensees in such a way that inclusion of non-essential 
patens should not impede competition. Implying that inclusion of non-
essential (possibly substitutable) patents does not necessarily have to be 
regarded as a violation of antitrust regulation.  
 
It is brought forward in the comments that the recommendations of the 
American Bar Association is in line with the reasoning in economic 
literature, both stating that the assessment of pro-competitive and anti-
competitive effects are essential. In short the American Bar Association 
advocates proposes a more effects-based analysis of patent pools under 
antitrust laws, this analysis is also supported by economic theory.116  
 
4.6.2 Presumption of market power 
It was expressed by the Bar Association, in a previous comment from 2002, 
that there is an obvious difference in the approach on IPRs and market 
power in the U.S and the EU antitrust law. EU law presuming legal 
monopoly from the holding of an IPR, whereas the U.S Guidelines for IPRs 
clearly does not to presume market power.117 
                                                
115 This is also expressed in paragraph 218 in the Commission Guidelines OJ [2004) C 
101/02. 
116 Joint Comments of the American Bar Association (2012).  
 
117 Joint Comments of the American Bar Association (2002) p. 3.  
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4.6.3 Expanision of the scope of the TTBER 
In the earlier opinion from the American bar Association, the scope of the 
TTBER was evaluated. The Bar Association suggested a possible extension 
of the Block exemption regulation in order to also exempt multi-party 
licensing. The Bar Association stated that there where no reason for the 
Commission to treat licence agreements between several parties 
fundamentally different from a bilateral license agreement. Indicating that 
focus should be on the relationship of the licensed technologies, not the 
agreement as such. The Bar Association where also of the opinion that 
technology pools (at least bilateral pools) should not be excluded from the 
block exemption, stating that exemption should apply even if exclusive 
territories where granted in the terms of agreement. Anti-competitive effects 
of such arrangements cannot be assumed since the pro-competitive effects 
can outweigh them.118  
                                                
118 Joint Comments of the American Bar Association (2092), p. 23-24. 
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5 Analysis 
5.1 The current state of law 
5.1.1 EU Law 
Under the current regulation on licensing agreements, patent pools are fully 
excluded from the possibility of block exemption. These arrangements 
require an analysis in accordance with art 101(3) TFEU for determination of 
whether to be considered pro-competitive. It is described in the 
Commissions Guidelines how these arrangements shall be assessed under 
antitrust regulation.  
 
The inclusion of substitute patents in a patent pool is, as stated in article 219 
of the Commission Guidelines, as a general rule considered an infringement 
of article 101(1) TFEU. The general rule has consequently resulted in the 
requirement that only essential patents must be included in patent pools. The 
requirement further inflict on the pooling firms to take into account such 
consideration during the formation of the pool; requiring parties under 
almost all circumstances to use an external expert, in order to ensure that all 
patents included fulfils the requirement of essentiality.  
 
5.1.2 U.S Law 
In the U.S Guidelines for IPRs there is no requirement of inclusion of only 
essential patents, or in any other remark constraining the competitive 
relationship between patents. The FTC and the DoJ however agrees that the 
inclusion of substitute patents in patent pools might increase the risk of anti-
competitive effects such as price-fixing and foreclosure of competing 
patents. The FTC and the DoJ do not reject the possibility of inclusion of 
substitute patents to amount positive effects on technology and economy. 
The FTC and the DoJ therefore apply an effects based analysis on patent 
pools, assessing the anti-competitive effects of inclusion of substitutable, 
non-essential patents and the efficiency gains of such pooling. Only in case 
of negative effects of inclusion of substitutable patents outweighing the 
positive effects, the patent pool will be regarded as infringing antitrust 
regulation. 
 
Throughout modern case law the FTC has applied an essentiality test in its 
assessment of patent pools. The definition of essentiality has not been 
consistent in case law, but it is clearly stated that a patent regarded as 
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essential is presumed not to be substitutable. Still, even if an essentiality test 
has been applied throughout case law, there are no such requirements in law 
for essentiality in order for the pool to be legitimate.   
 
5.2 Current Technolgical developments; 
Patent pools within Biotechnology 
Patent pooling has up until now mainly been used within the sector of 
electronics industry, a sector where there are a large number of patents and 
industry standards usually are set. It has recently become apparent, due to 
the arisen demand for development within biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals, that in order to quench the demand for vaccines and other 
medical products, patent pooling can be beneficial also within this sector. 
Pooling of patents is believed to increase the possibility of solving public 
health issues, such as development of malaria vaccine or SARS vaccine.119  
 
A main issue for such pooling is the lack of standards within biotechnology 
and the pharmaceutical industry, due to less fragmentation in terms of 
components in production within these areas. The pharmaceutical industry 
has throughout history been defined by a model of one patent for one 
product, in contrast to the electronic industry where one product requires 
several patented components.  
 
It is stated in the Commission Guidelines, article 211, that there is no 
inherent link between patent pools and standards. However, pools has in 
recent case law supported industry standards and the essentiality test has 
been applied in such a way that all patents considered essential for the 
compliance with a given standard has been regarded non-substitutable.  
 
The lack of standards therefore makes determination of essentiality difficult, 
posing an obstacle to the formation of patent pools since the essentiality 
requirement has been made a general rule under EU antitrust regulation.120 
Adding to the problem is the fact that within many areas of biotechnological 
research the final products is yet to be developed, making determining of 
essentiality difficult.121  
 
Still, there are several benefits of creating pools within this field of 
technology since blocking patents often hinder innovation. Many patents 
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constitute basic building blocks necessary in order to move forward in 
pharmaceutical development. Cooperative efforts like pooling of patents can 
enable firms to benefit from the innovations of others and focus on further 
development, thus increasing the pace of innovation. Other benefits are also 
apparent, such as the reduction of transaction costs.122 
 
The main requirement, in order to enable patent pooling in the 
biotechnology- and pharmaceutical industry, is a less incriminating antitrust 
approach towards pooling of non-essential patents. Antitrust agencies must 
accept a change in the requirements of essentiality in order for pooling 
within biotechnology to be possible. Alternatively a special regulation or 
guidelines would be necessary in order to increase the pace of innovation 
within pharmaceuticals and other biotechnology development.123 
 
5.3 Presumption of market power 
It has been clarified that the assessment of intellectual property rights, and 
the holding of such rights in terms of market power for the holder of such 
right, is different within the EU and in the U.S legal system. In the EU the 
holding of an exclusive right, such as an IPR, is regarded to amount to 
certain legal monopoly power due to the exclusive right inherent in a patent. 
Such presumption is not inflicted by the U.S Guidelines.  
The difference might very well affect the assessment under the respective 
legal systems, since monopoly power will increase the risk of anti-
competitive effects of joint licensing within an area of technology. The 
presumption of legal monopoly power in EU law most certainly results in a 
more restrictive approach to joint licensing between parties.  
 
5.4 The Draft TTBER and Guidelines 
The Commission has suggested a more lenient approach to patent pools in 
the draft for the updated TTBER and the Guidelines, suggesting a safe 
harbour to apply in regards of patent pools. According to the suggested 
Guidelines pools that are; open to all patent holders, non-exclusive, 
ensuring the protection of sensitive information and the incentive to engage 
in further research and development will fulfil the requirements for a safe 
harbour, solitarily if the pool also fulfils the requirement of including only 
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essential patents. In case of a pool being given a safe harbour, the 
Commission suggests that a patent pool can be block exempted in similarity 
with other licensing agreement.  
 
It is visible in case law and in the U.S Guidelines that the approach held by 
the FTC and the DoJ regarding antitrust regulation on patent pools is far less 
restrictive than the EU Commission’s approach.  The American Bar 
Association has suggested an even more lenient Regulation and Guideline in 
the matter than the current pair, as well as the two suggested by the 
Commission for 2014. The difference brought up by the Bar Association is 
the essentiality requirement applied by the Commission, stating that the 
effects based analysis applied by the U.S antitrust agencies is a better 
approach in order to account for the many positive economical effects of 
patent pooling.  
 
The newly suggested safe harbour possibly widens the possibility for the 
creation of patent pools for firms within the EU, since pooling arrangements 
fulfilling the requirements will be block exempted from the application of 
article 101(1). However, this does not weaken the essentiality requirement. 
A possibility for a wider scope, making possible the inclusion also of non-
essential patent is however implied by the Commission, according to Peter 
Alexiadis, read 3.5.   
 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
In order to make possible a wider scope for the use of patent pools, I suggest 
a change in the use of the essentiality requirement as a general rule in the 
Commissions antitrust assessment of pools. The current application of this 
rule may eliminate the possibility for patent pooling within sectors where 
industry standards are not applied due to the difficulty of establishing 
essentiality. The effects of the essentiality requirement are apparent within 
the biotechnology sector and the pharmaceutical sector, where there is no 
application of standards and no portfolio of patents determined in the 
preface of development.  
 
Even so, there are obvious benefits of the essentiality requirement, since it 
ensures the avoidance of bundling of substitute patents and joint licensing of 
these at very high costs. Bundling of substitute patents is likely to have 
detrimental effect on competition and must therefore be cared for. However, 
I do not believe that such detriment shall be presumed, but rather evaluated 
in contrast to the benefits of the pooling arrangement. In cases where the 
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including substitute patents are necessary in order for the pool to function as 
intended, the purpose might outweigh the negative effects on competition. 
In my opinion an analysis in accordance with 101(3) TFEU, with no 
application of presumed anti-competitive effects would be suitable, in order 
to widen the scope of the antitrust assessment of patent pools. This would 
also bring the EU Commissions approach closer to the effects based 
approach held by U.S antitrust agencies.   
 
The economical and technological benefits of research and development are 
vast, and methods strengthening these activities should be regarded as 
competition and welfare enhancing. Furthermore, technological 
development is largely beneficial for consumers, something that is the 
fundamental objective for both antitrust regulation and IPR. Arrangements 
supporting such effects should therefore be supported in law, to the largest 
extent possible. I believe that patent pools in many ways enable 
technological development by assembling patents and knowledge, making 
them accessible to actors within certain fields of technology. Patent pools 
also open up for new actors on the market to access current technology. Due 
to these reasons patent pooling must in large result in faster development 
and lowered costs for actors in technological sectors.  
 
My suggestion for a future approach on patent pools in the TTBER and 
primarily the Commission’s Guidelines is to evaluate the full necessity of 
the essentiality requirement. I do not suggest inclusion of patent pools in the 
TTBER in order to block exempt such agreement, but instead an adjustment 
of the current Guidelines.    
 
I believe that the assessment of essentiality should be given a less 
determinative authority. The essentiality test must in all aspects still be 
applied since essentiality of included patents provides an indication of 
inclusion of substitutable patents. However, a more thorough analysis must 
be applied in order to establish the net effects of such inclusion. 
Additionally, essentiality must not be the only possible assessment of 
substitutability. Under circumstances where essentiality cannot be 
determined, the Commission must still be able to establish whether patents 
are substitutable or not. Without such analysis, patent pooling will not be 
possible in the sectors of biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, for instance.  
 
The current application of the essentiality requirement, excluding all patents 
that are not regarded essential, is merely a way of excluding substitute 
patents, since essentiality is an indication of non-substitutability. U.S case 
law indicates that an effects based analysis shall be applied on patent pools 
including substitutable patents, since such inclusion might have positive 
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effects outweighing possible detriment on competition. U.S antitrust 
regulation is thus more lenient in terms of substitutable patents.  
 
I suggest a change in the current EU practice of presuming anti-competitive 
effects from non-essentiality and substitutability of patents. In my opinion 
the application of an effect based analysis, fully in accordance with Article 
101(3) TFEU, should replace the current general rule in the Guidelines. An 
analysis in accordance with Article 101(3) that evaluates the net effects of 
substitutable patents in patent pools will ensure that no detriment on 
competition will occur. Possible price-fixing, as well as other anti-
competitive effects that can amount from joint licensing of substitute 
patents, will be cared for under article 101(3). A presumption that inclusion 
of substitutable (non-essential) patens will harm competition is therefor in 
my opinion redundant. 
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